What OCSP is used for in this case is checking validity of developer certificates, not app certificates.
Eg. if you download and install an app outside of App Store that’s supposedly signed by Ableton, but is actually someone else who has gotten hold of Ableton’s developer keys - or install an app that is actually by Ableton but they’ve suddenly decided they’d like to destroy everyone’s computers - then Apple can react when they find out, revoke the developer certificate immediately, and stop (self-distributed) applications from the malignant developer from working the next time they are started.
The other way to do this would be to periodically update a list of revoked developer certificates separately from starting applications or installing them. This is also something that’s been used (possibly not by Apple), but has the drawback that the checks aren’t real time - you could happily run a malignant app until the revocation lists were updated the next time.
So basically the use it’s intended for is “we’ve found out that this developer, who is signed up for our developer plan and promised to play by rules, and has apparently signed this app with their certificate to certify it’s actually written by them, has written malware or leaked their keys so they are either no longer playing by rules or possibly not the actual party who has actually written and signed the app you are trying to start”.
As for trust / ownership implications, there’s been discussion about those during the thread already. I guess the other side is, that Apple is running a trust mechanism for the developers (developer plans & certificates), and the OCSP checks or similar are logical / necessary evil for that. If you don’t at least periodically check whether the developer certificate for company x is still valid or not, you don’t know whether you can still trust that certificate to only be in possession of company x, or trust company x to be honest. (Whatever should be done with that information is another thing, and actually, I’m not entirely sure if you can bypass code signing and certificate checks altogether, if you really want to for some reason…?)
FWIW, a very similar process happens with web browsers when you surf to HTTPS secured sites (eg. this one) - the validity of certificate chain is checked, and if something on the way has been compromised, the browser knows the certificate is revoked / invalid and displays a huge warning about an insecure site / potential security issue which will be major pain in the butt to skip for a good reason. Most browsers do specifically use the very same OCSP mechanism. I suppose it’s juts less scary and intrusive when it isn’t about installed applications but sites you navigate to, and the governing body for the whole world wide web is not a single computer / software company. But in that sense one could argue it is an industry standard procedure in a way.